India have just won the Asian Games gold medal and secured qualification for the Los Angeles Olympics, but the pressure on Craig Fulton has not gone away. After India finished eighth at the World Cup, there were already voices calling for Fulton to be sacked. Those calls have only grown through the Asian Games, despite India ultimately winning the tournament.
The gold did not remove the concerns around this team. India put big scores past weaker opposition, yet the semi-final against Pakistan showed how quickly control could disappear. India went 3-0 up, allowed Pakistan to come back to 3-3 and needed a late winner to reach the final.
The biggest question around Fulton remains tactical. India are still heavily dependent on defence-to-counter, and when that route is closed there is still no properly developed second way to play. Fulton deserves criticism for that, but sacking him now would still go too far.
Defence-to-Counter Was Still Working Before the World Cup
The calls for Fulton to go would make more sense if his system had already stopped producing results before the World Cup. The European leg of the Pro League gives a different picture. India beat Germany 3-1, the Netherlands 3-2 and Pakistan twice, while both matches against England finished level in regulation. India lost the other matches against the Netherlands and Germany.
Those results came shortly before the World Cup and showed that India were still getting results against strong opposition while playing the same basic defence-to-counter hockey Fulton had built since taking over. Paris had already provided the bigger proof, with India winning a second consecutive Olympic bronze under him.
Rourkela earlier in the same Pro League season had been much worse. India lost all four matches against Belgium and Argentina, including an 8-0 defeat to Argentina, while using more younger players alongside several established seniors. Rourkela raised questions around depth and succession. The European leg that followed showed the main tactical structure could still produce results.
The World Cup therefore arrived after a period where Fulton’s system was still working. What happened there exposed the limits of that system rather than proving that everything built before it had stopped working.
Read More: High Stakes, Low Magic: Why the Asian Games Feels Flat After the World Cup
The World Cup Exposed India’s Missing Plan B
Defence-to-counter works by moving the ball forward quickly once India regain possession. It allows India to attack before the opposition resets and can bypass midfield completely when space opens higher up the pitch.
The problem comes when opponents take that space away. India then need midfielders to take control, recycle possession and build attacks through several phases rather than immediately searching for the direct route. The World Cup exposed how underdeveloped that part of India’s game remains. Once the counter was closed, the midfield struggled to influence matches and India often looked short of ideas in possession.
The same tendency remained visible at the Asian Games. Even in the 5-1 final against Malaysia, India still went long from deep positions regularly, including through Harmanpreet Singh, instead of building through midfield. Fulton went into a World Cup without another properly prepared way of playing, and he has to take responsibility for that. India need a second route that can operate alongside the defensive structure and transition game that have already produced results.
What Would Changing the Coach Actually Fix?
If India’s biggest weakness is tactical and Fulton controls the tactics, changing the coach is a reasonable option. Another coach could retain the defensive structure, change the buildup and find a different way to use midfield. The real question is whether changing the coach now gives India a better chance of fixing those problems than giving Fulton the opportunity to respond to what the World Cup exposed.
There is also the argument that India should return to a more attacking style. Graham Reid’s India played a more attacking and fluid brand of hockey, won bronze at the Tokyo Olympics and then finished ninth at the 2023 World Cup. Fulton took India in a different direction, with greater emphasis on defence and transition. India won bronze in Paris and then finished eighth at the 2026 World Cup.
Two very different approaches have produced similar cycles. Both delivered an Olympic medal and both were followed by disappointing World Cup campaigns. Changing from a defensive coach to an attacking coach does not remove the need for tactical adaptability.
Fulton’s main system was still producing results during the European leg of the Pro League shortly before the World Cup. The World Cup then exposed what happened when opponents stopped India from countering and there was no properly prepared second route.
He should now get the opportunity to respond to that failure. If India still cannot build through midfield or change their approach when the counter is closed by the end of the next Pro League campaign, the argument for replacing him becomes much stronger.
Read More: India Have Won the Asian Games. Now It Is Time to Change the Team
Selectors Have to Share the Responsibility
Personnel is another area where the entire debate cannot sit with Fulton. The head coach has significant influence over the squad and has to take responsibility for the players he backs and the roles he gives them. Hockey India also has a selection committee involved in deciding who makes the national team.
The same basic issue existed after the 2023 World Cup. The players underperformed, Graham Reid resigned after the tournament and the coaching setup changed. The selection process that produced that squad did not face the same consequence. India now face another period where difficult personnel decisions have to be made. If some senior players need to be replaced or gradually phased out, Fulton and the selectors have to make those calls together.
Rourkela also showed why the transition will not be straightforward. India used more younger and less experienced players during that leg while several senior players were still involved, and the results were poor. Four matches against Belgium and Argentina are not enough to judge the younger group, especially with experienced players still on the pitch, but India do not yet have an obvious group of replacements forcing major changes.
The squad needs refreshing, and the selection structure has to be part of that process. Replacing the coach on its own does not create better options.
The 2026-27 Pro League Should Decide What Comes Next
Fulton should now be judged on whether he can correct the problems the World Cup exposed. The 2026-27 Pro League provides the right assessment period, with a top-five finish a reasonable expectation alongside visible changes in how India play.
Midfield has to become a genuine part of the buildup. India need to be able to keep possession and construct attacks when the counter is unavailable. The team also has to show greater tactical flexibility during matches, while Fulton and the selectors begin making the personnel changes required for the next Olympic cycle.
If India finish around the top five and those changes are visible, Fulton will have justified the extra time. If the same tactical rigidity remains, midfield is still regularly bypassed and India still have no reliable second way to play, the case for replacing him becomes much stronger.
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